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No. 6194

In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
E. L. ALLEX,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LE\\""IS Y. TRrE~L\.X, Judge of the
Second Judicial Di~trict of the State
of U t a h; JOSEPH HOLBROOl(,
Sheriff of Daris County, r t a h;
CALVIN G. ROBERTS, Deputy
Sheriff of Davis County, State of "Ctah;
David F. Smith, Commissioner of
Agriculture of the State of "Ctah; and
C. G. McCULLOrGH, Deputy In·spector of the Utah State Commission
of Agriculture,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF
IRVINE, SKEEN, THURMAN & MINER,
Attornevs for Plaintiff
-.

--) ~ J.
-'4;'-

J-.-,~.

•

1t...

.

-

•....

'

~a,

J~l$. . )'r ...--:

j:l r . '

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In

The Supreme Gourt
of the

State of Utah
Plaintiff,
E. L. ALLEN,
vs.
LEWIS V. TRUEMAN, Judge of the
Second Judicial District of the State
of U t a h; JOSEPH HOLBROOK,
·Sheriff o f Davis County, Utah;
CALVIN G. ROBERTS, Deputy
Sheriff of Davis County, State of Utah;
David F. Smith, Commissioner of
Agriculture of the State of Utah ; and
C. G. McCULLOUGH, Deputy In'Speclor of the Utah State Commission
of Agriculture,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF
Because -of the fact that the defendants take up
the major portion of their brief in arguing on
matters that are not before the Court and could not
possibly be considered by this Court in this proceeding, and because we feel that it is necessary
to point these matters out to the Court to prevent
a misunderstanding as to the issues involved and
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the relief sought by this proceeding, plaintiff feels
it necessary to submit this reply brief.
We will briefly refer to a few of the points of
and a few of the instances where defendants have argued entirely beside the point.

~iiscussion

On page 2 of defendants' brief, counsel refers
to the United Statt_•s Public. Health Ordinance relative to milk, and states that numerous dairies named
in the brief have complied with such ordinance.
;r_rhe plaintiff v;rill submit the product he sells for
comparison with that sold by other dairies if counsel wishes, but we would like to remind counsel that
this proceeding has nothing whatever to do with
the quality of any product sold, but merely the question of containers in which milk products are sold,
and whether search and seizure should be available
to individuals for the recovery of the possession of
those containers which the dairies have delivered
out of their own possession.
On page 4 of defendants' brief, counsel states
that the services of the Bottle Exchange are available to plaintiff. 'Ve reply: yes, they are available
to plaintiff if, but only if, plaintiff is willing to give
everything a.nJ receive nothing in return. Counsel
then goes on to mention the bottle costs to the milk
industry, a large part of which is due to "theft and
wrongfull abstraction" etc. If counsel means to
infer that plaintiff came into possession of any bottles wrongfully, let him or anyone else so charge
and prove in a proper manner rather than to make
such inferences in this proceeding in an attempt to
becloud the main issues, or in an attempt to raise
~· prejudice in the minds of the members of this
Honorable Court. The possession of bottles which
the plaintiff may now have or may have had in the
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change fostered and maintained by the very dairies
whom counsel for the defendm1ts represents, but
that is wholly beside tlte point in this proceeding.
On page 16 of his brief, counsel states as his
first proposition on which he argues in the brief, the
question "has the plaintiff any right in law to use
the trade-1narked bottles of other dairies in the operation of his crt:'am station ·t '' The very reason
why plaintiff asks for the writ of prohibition is because the District Court at Farmington was proceeding and threatening· to proceed to determine
'Whether plaintiff had the right to possession- not
the right to use, these bottles, and plaintiff
contends that that question being merely and adjudication of a civil right, -was improper in a criminal proceeding of search and seizure, and plaintiff asks this Court to prohibit the District Court
from proceeding to determine that civil right in a
criminal action or quasi-criminal action upon search
and seizure. Clearly, the plaintiff could not ask
this Court to prohibit the District Court from pro~
ceeding to determine that civil question and then
either the plaintiff or defendants turn around and
ask this Court to determine that same question upon
these prohibition proceedings .
Again, on page 12, counRel states ''so . . . .
the first question to be determined . . . is whether
or not plaintiff . . . acquires any interest whatsoever in and to the trade-marked bottles . . . . ''
Counsel either does not see the point, or does not
care to meet the issue squarely, or is attempting to
drag a herring across the trail, or lay a smokescreen in an attempt to obscure the real issues upon
which this proceeding is based.
The plaintiff would welcome litigation in a
proper plenary suit upon the question as to whether
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under the practice of dairies in the Salt Lake area,
lhe mode of acquiring possession of these bottles
does or does not give an interest in this property to
the plaintiff. We would further welcome litigation
upon the question as to whether plaintiff's products
are inferior or superior, or whether plaintiff has
been, by the use of such bottles, misleading the public. As a matter of fact, plaintiff is proud of the
products he sells, and defendants know that they
have no basis for any charge of fraud, misbranding
or misleading the public with respect to such products.
On pages 14 and 15, counsel attempts to incite
sympathy by pointing out the hardship that would
come to various dairies if they were compelled to
resort to replevin. The various dairies can't afford
the maintenance of a proper action in replevin
where they would have to put up a bond before they
could repossess personal property, so they want
the State to assume that burden for them, and the
only way the State can do so is to make it a criminal proceeding. Even so, they are willing to go to
that length to get the State to assume their burden
rather than to apply the remedy they have in their
own hands and under their own control, viz., making the customers contract for the return of these
bottles and making' them responsible for them if
they don't return the bottles, which, in spite of the
suggestion of Justice Thurman in the Clover Leaf
Dairy v. Van Gerven case, they have ·wholly ~efused
to do, counsel's statements on page 5 of his brief
to the contrar~r notwith~tandinr:.

The majority of counsel's brief is used up in
arguing that plaintiff has no interest in these botties, that he has no right to use and no right to refill them, and may not have complied with inspection standards or have as high quality milk as other
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5
dairies, and mio·ht be r>nilty of unfair competition
in the use of b~ands; ~nigl;t even be classed as a
felon or malefactor, ns counsel infers on page 25
of his brid. All of thi~ might be interesting if
true, and plaintiff is willing to meet sueh charges
whenever he may be called upon properly to do so~
but we must remind counsel that all of t11is is immaterial in this proceeding and does not even
necessitate the denial which plaintiff could easily
substantiate.
We must repeat again and point out to counsel
the main question at issue in this case, Yiz. the right
to ·use the criminal .authorities of the State and the
criminal prucedure of search aud seizure for the
maintenance of a mere prh·afe right, i.e. the recorery of the mere possession of a limited species
of personal property.
The plaintiff and any other citizen similarly
situated should have the right to try all of the
questions posed by counsel in his brief, in a proper
civil action where he would not be classed as a
felon and malefactor at the outset, and where other
individuals who would claim the right to possession
of property before trial, would be compelled to put
up a bond to guarantee that plaintiff would not
be compelled to seek redress from the State - a
disinterested party - if property is wrongfully
taken before such hearing is had.
Even the cases cited by counsel that do have
some bearing upon the question at issue in this
case - the question of search and seizure or the
constitutionality of this statute - do not refer to
cases where search and seizure was involved.
The case- of Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police
Court, cited on page 26 of counsel's brief, had reference to a statute making it incumbent on a person
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finding or receiving a container with a registered
brand, to 1nake diligent effort to find the owner.
No question of search and seizure for the recovery
of that property was involved, and the case cannot be in point either upon the proceeding here,
nor as changing the rule set forth in the cases cited
in plaintiff's original brief, and we respectfully
refer the Court to the cases in plaintiff's original
brief, none of which have been answered in any way
by the defendants.
Counsel even compares the milk industry to a
public utility on the closing page of his brief. We
do not believe that the State has yet gone so far as to
either prosecute or defend in its own name actions
involving civil rights of any public utility with respect to its personal property. We believe that even
a public utility must resort to the civil courts in an
action of replevin if it wishes to recover personal
property claimed by it from the possession of third
parties and in such an action even a public utility
would be compelled to put up a bond if it claimed
recovery of possession of such personal property
prior to a civil trial and prior to a judgment on
the merits . .
Plaintiff respectfully submits that the writ of
prohibition should be made permanent.

IRVINE, SKEEN, THURMAN & MINER,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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